[Hobbes] I understand presently that justice and injustice [135L] are not at all inventions of
the human mind, as one philosopher
10
has alleged. Men, he said, made laws for their mutual
protection; they made an agreement amongst themselves, and they are obligated to that. The one
who is missing from the agreement or accord, finding himself weaker than the rest who have
entered into the contract—that is, those who have made the agreement—finds himself among
enemies who satisfy their pride by punishing him. Thus on account of pride, for fear of being
punished, he must observe the laws of the country where he lives, not because they are just in
and of themselves—for, [135R] idiots
11
, they say, we see entirely the opposite—but because in
subjecting ourselves to them we have nothing to fear from those who are more powerful.
According to these philosophers, all is naturally permitted to all men.
It is not possible to say anything more brutal or more senseless; strength gave the lion
dominion over the other brutes, and it is often the means by which men encroach upon one
another. But to believe that this is permissible and that the strongest has the right to everything,
without even committing any crime, is to make human society [136L] an assembly of brute
beasts; for it is clear as day, and more obvious than the fact that [the sum of] the three angles of a
triangle are equal to [the sum of] two right angles, that there is an immutable order and a law
that God Himself can never avoid, and according to which all minds must govern their conduct.
God is just, in the sense that He cannot but love His
12
divine perfections. I am certain of this
truth, but that is not enough; I must still examine whether God is essentially just, in the sense that
he necessarily rewards good deeds [136R] and unavoidably punishes everything that offends
His
13
divine attributes. Until now I have only had rather crude ideas about justice and the
10
Abbreviated in MS as phē. The reference is to Hobbes, Leviathan Ch. 13: “To this war of every man
against every man this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong,
justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no
law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the
faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well
as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent
also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no dominion, no ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ distinct, but only
that to be every man’s that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill
condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in, though with a possibility to come out of it,
consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.” (https://www.bartleby.com/34/5/13.html,
emphasis mine). See also https://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest/ - SH3a
11
This is an archaic expression, not much used since the 17th c. Au delà l’eau means “on the other side of
the water,” and beginning in the 16th c was used to refer to people who had just arrived (by boat,
presumably) in a new land. The implication was that they were uninformed and foolishly naïve about
their new surroundings. By the late 17th c the sense seems to be more pejorative; Cotgrave’s French-
English dictionary of 1673 defines gens de delà l’eau as “simple fellowes, witlesse companions, ignorant
creatures.” It’s a little hard to fit into this sentence, especially given that delà l’eau does not seem to be
modifying a noun.
12
I’ve emended MS ces to ses.
13
I’ve emended MS ces to ses.